Page 435 |
Federation and Meteorology |
|||
Table of Contents
Glimpse of the RAAF Meteorological Service Preface Foreword Introduction Chapter 1: Growing Up Chapter 2: Port Moresby Before Pearl Harbour Chapter 3: Port Moresby After Pearl Harbour Work in the Meteorological Office Japanese Land in Rabaul Catalina and Hudson Operations First Sight of the Japanese Japanese Plans for the Invasion of Port Moresby RAAF Meteorologists Under Threat of Japanese Advance More Air Raids on Port Moresby The Story of the Hudson A Blow to Morale More Air Raids but No 75 Squadron Kittykawks Arrive Japanese Attempt to Invade Port Moresby by Sea Japanese Submarines Attack Sydney Attack on MV MacDhui Return to Australia The Meteorologists' Contribution Chapter 4: Allied Air Force HQ and RAAF Command, Brisbane Chapter 5: Japan Surrenders and We Are Demobilised Epilogue Acknowledgements Appendix 1: References Appendix 2: Milestones Appendix 3: Papers Published in Tropical Weather Research Bulletins Appendix 4: Radiosonde Observations 194146 Index Search Help Contact us |
Japanese Attempt to Invade Port Moresby by SeaFrom 10 April onwards it became clear that the Japanese would attempt to invade Port Moresby by sea. The rugged terrain and thick jungles of the Owen Stanley Range made a land assault on Port Moresby by their forces from the Lae, Salamaua, Nadzab area extremely difficult. In any event Port Moresby was a key for their success and we experienced heavy air-raids every other day on Jackson's strip, the wharf or any ship which might be in the harbour. By the end of April they had occupied key locations on New Britain, Manus and Bougainville Islands and had a foothold on the northern coast of New Guinea. We had no information on a plan for the defence of Port Moresby nor any directions on what action we should take in case of a Japanese landing.The heavy and persistent Japanese bombing and strafing attacks on Jackson's strip made its use by the fighters of RAAF No 75 Squadron, the USAF Airacobras and RAAF DC-3 transport aircraft extremely hazardous. No other aircraft were based in Port Moresby although our morale was boosted by the sight of US twin-engine bombers calling in to refuel before proceeding to attack Japanese bases. Japanese troop transports, protected by aircraft carriers and other naval forces, landed troops on Tulagi in the Solomon Islands on 3 May 1942 and on 6 May another group of 12 troop transports, supported by a naval force including three aircraft carriers, cruisers, destroyers and submarines was about to round the south-east tip of New Guinea en route for Port Moresby. Fortunately for us, two US naval task forces were in the Coral Sea at the same time, having been alerted to Japanese intentions by US and Australian efforts in intercepting and deciphering Japanese Naval and Air Force radio messages (see Bleakley, 1991). The ensuing battle was unique in naval history in that there was no ship to ship engagement, all attacks being from carrier-based and land-based aircraft. The engagement resulted in loss or severe damage to aircraft carriers and other naval vessels and considerable loss of aircraft by both sides. The Japanese were not prepared to proceed with a landing at Port Moresby and turned back to Rabaul.
© Online Edition Australian Science and Technology Heritage Centre and Bureau of Meteorology 2001 Published by Australian Science and Technology Heritage Centre, using the Web Academic Resource Publisher http://www.austehc.unimelb.edu.au/fam/0435.html |